Ronald Dworkin's The Rise of the Imperial Self also interprets current American culture by means of a comparative technique. While Lipset contrasts late-twentieth-century America as a whole with other modern nations, Dworkin measures the dominant character type in America today (the "imperial self" or "expressive individualist") against ideal typical personas in various civilizations at key moments in their development: the crumbling Roman empire of Augustine, medieval European aristocratic society, Tocqueville's America, and the United States of the 1950s "organization man." The most intriguing aspect of Dworkin's project is how useful the categories of Augustinian psychology turn out to be in analyzing the ethos of diverse societies throughout history.
In any event, conceptual analysis of law remains an important, if controversial, project in contemporary legal theory. Conceptual theories of law can be divided into two main headings: (a) those that affirm there is a conceptual relation between law and morality and (b) those that deny that there is such a relation. Nevertheless, Ronald Dworkin's view is often characterized as a third theory partly because it is not clear where he stands on the question of whether there is a conceptual relation between law and morality.
The contents of this thin volume (only 8 essays) are extremely wide-ranging -- from positivism and the nature of law, to paternalism, to civil disobedience, to abortion, and finally the freedom of expression. Each essay acts as a mere representative of each area of the philosophy of law. That is to say, Dworkin does not provide inclusive units on each topic as many modern-day anthologies do. Incidentally, most of Dworkin's selection can be found in most modern-day jurisprudence anthologies, particularly the Hart, Devlin, and Thomson essays. (I find it peculiar that Dworkin included nothing by Lon Fuller in this volume.) Thus this collection is not essential; it is more or less a "flight" (like a wine or beer flight) of classical writings in 20th-century jurisprudence. Recommended for readers who wish to get a taste of phil. law but without having to plow through the standard, large phil. law anthology -- such as, e.g., Schauer & Sinnott-Armstrong's first-rate "The Philosophy of Law" (Oxford U.P., 1995) textbook.
According to natural law legal theory, the authority of legal standards necessarily derives, at least in part, from considerations having to do with the moral merit of those standards. There are a number of different kinds of natural law legal theories, differing from each other with respect to the role that morality plays in determining the authority of legal norms. The conceptual jurisprudence of John Austin provides a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of law that distinguishes law from non-law in every possible world. Classical natural law theory such as the theory of focuses on the overlap between natural law moral and legal theories. Similarly, the neo-naturalism of John Finnis is a development of classical natural law theory. In contrast, the procedural naturalism of Lon L. Fuller is a rejection of the conceptual naturalist idea that there are necessary substantive moral constraints on the content of law. Lastly, Ronald Dworkin’s theory is a response and critique of . All of these theories subscribe to one or more basic tenets of natural law legal theory and are important to its development and influence.
Dworkin Theory of Law as Integrity - UK Essays | UKEssays
We provide excellent essay writing service 24/7. Enjoy proficient essay writing and custom writing services provided by professional academic writers. Law, Rights, and Justice essay. Introduction: Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls dedicated a lot of works to this phenomenon. They tried to draw a sharp line between. Ronald Dworkin; Ronald Dworkin en 2008. InformaciÃ³n personal; Nombre de nacimiento: Ronald Myles Dworkin: Nacimiento: 11 de diciembre de 1931 Worcester, Estados Unidos.
Ronald Dworkin | The New York Review of Books
Interpretivism is famously associated with Ronald Dworkin, whodeveloped the position in a number of publications spanning 45 years(see the works of Dworkin cited in the Bibliography). Dworkin'swritings have stimulated a great deal of debate (the following aresome examples from the vast secondary literature: Mitchell 1983; Cohen1984; Hart 1994 (Postscript); Raz 1972, 1986, 1994: Chapters 10 and13, 2001; Finnis 1992; Coleman 2001b; Brink 2001; Burley2004; Hershovitz2006a; Ripstein 2007; Gardner 2012). We shall focus on the explanationof the position developed and defended by Dworkin (though notnecessarily on his way of presenting and defending it).
John Finnis takes himself to be explicating and developing the views of Aquinas and Blackstone. Like Bix, Finnis believes that the naturalism of Aquinas and Blackstone should not be construed as a conceptual account of the existence conditions for law. According to Finnis, the classical naturalists were not concerned with giving a conceptual account of legal validity; rather they were concerned with explaining the moral force of law: "the principles of natural law explain the obligatory force (in the fullest sense of 'obligation') of positive laws, even when those laws cannot be deduced from those principles" (Finnis 1980, 23-24). On Finnis's view of the Overlap Thesis, the essential function of law is to provide a justification for state coercion (a view he shares with Ronald Dworkin). Accordingly, an unjust law can be legally valid, but it cannot provide an adequate justification for use of the state coercive power and is hence not obligatory in the fullest sense; thus, an unjust law fails to realize the moral ideals implicit in the concept of law. An unjust law, on this view, is legally binding, but is not fully law.
Dworkin On Paternalism Free Essays
With the incisiveness and lucid style for which he is renowned, Ronald Dworkin has written a masterful explanation of how the Anglo-American legal system works and on what principles it is grounded. LawâÂÂs Empire is a full-length presentation of his theory of law that will be studied and ...
A familiar hypothesis is that the moral concern in play is raised byinstitutions' effective power to use force or otherwise coercively todirect citizens' action. Legality is supposed to constrain or regulatethat power, by constituting a necessary condition that demands againstpersons must meet if they are to be permissibly enforced. Notice thatin this role, legality is not a moral filter, a moral condition ofvalidity of norms. In the hypothesis in discussion, there is no poolof candidate norms, identified by nonmoral tests, to be put through afurther, moral test, before they are pronounced finally valid. Rather,legality is a condition of permissible enforcement of demands againsta person, a special moral test that applies to any such demand,including those that are entirely unfounded as well as those that maypass other moral tests. (This is the moral concern, and correspondingrole of legality, developed in Dworkin 1986, see also Dworkin2011. Alternative interpretivist hypotheses might assign to legality asimilarly distinctive role in relation to some other moralconcern.)In Riggs v. Palmer, for example, the court considered the question of whether a murderer could take under the will of his victim. At the time the case was decided, neither the statutes nor the case law governing wills expressly prohibited a murderer from taking under his victim's will. Despite this, the court declined to award the defendant his gift under the will on the ground that it would be wrong to allow him to profit from such a grievous wrong. On Dworkin's view, the court decided the case by citing "the principle that no man may profit from his own wrong as a background standard against which to read the statute of wills and in this way justified a new interpretation of that statute" (Dworkin 1977, 29).